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Abstract
Security and Privacy has become a dominant issue for both consumers and corporations.
In this paper, we investigate how customer behavior is affected after they have been a
victim of financial fraud. Our analysis provides insights into how security concerns affect
the continuation of the existing relationship of the customers depending on kind of fraud-
ulent transactions. With the data from one of the largest banks in the US, we show that the
probability of ending the relationship in the next six months increases significantly after
a fraudulent transaction. We provide results with a detailed analysis including the kind
of fraudulent transaction, tenure and location.
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Introduction
A spate of identity thefts, data breaches and relentless media coverage of these issues has brought security
issues to the forefront of not only consumers but also policy makers. This is even more important for the
financial industry. Users trust their banks to protect their financial assets and information. Unfortunately,
hackers also realize that financial firms are an attractive target. Phishing attacks, social engineering, DDoS
attacks are good examples of various ways the hackers try to breach firms’ security. They use these tech-
niques to gain access to users’ credit card numbers, or bank account passwords and commit financial fraud.
The main focus of this study is to understand the effect of an adverse security event on the relationship be-
tween the customer and the financial organization. The adverse security events can be either identified by
the bank (such as a data breach) or by the customer (such as fraudulent transactions). In this study, we
concentrate mainly on the security events identified by the customer.
Policy makers have struggled to come to a consensus on how to protect users and reduce the number of
breaches, frauds, identity thefts and so on. There is a belief that firms’ incentives are not as well aligned with
user incentives. After all, end users pay a significant price for insecurity and fraud. But passing stringent
regulations are also opposed by industry, arguing that many regulations are ineffective and increase the
cost of business. That said, a key goal of policy makers has been to increase the transparency of business
practices. For example, the data breach notification laws (Wikipedia 2015) passed by majority of states over
the last decade force firms to notify users of potential data breaches. In fact, a large number of data breaches
reported in the newspapers is possibly an outcome of these regulations where, firms were forced to disclose
breaches. The goal of transparency and disclosure is to name and shame the firm, and also allow users to
take appropriate steps in protecting themselves. Thus, transparency improves competition since users start
paying attention to firmpractices. Similarly, firms arewary of bad press and hence have incentives to protect
customers (see (Romanosky et al. 2011) for details). Financial firms also face other regulations that ensures
that they protect customer accounts.
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But fundamentally, the key aspect ofmost of these regulations is that firms feel pressured to take appropriate
actions. However, a lot depends onwhether consumers pay attention to security frauds and if they arewilling
to hold the firms responsible. After a breach or an adverse event, many researchers have shown that firms’
stock price suffer (Acquisti et al. 2006a). This suggests that firms feel pressure to behave more responsibly
andhence investmore in security. But the stock pricemeasures tend to be short termandusually these prices
rebound. A long term effect is only possible if firms actually end up losingmarket share to competitors. So if
firms with poor security practices, poor fraud prevention, and repeated breaches, if forced to disclose these
practices and losemarket share in the long run, thenwe canbe sure that these regulations have teeth. But this
requires that end users are willing to punish guilty firms by taking their business elsewhere and there is little
evidence of that (see (Gaynor et al. 2012) who show that hospitals inmore competitivemarkets are not likely
to have fewer breaches). If anything, researchers argue that repeated disclosures of data breaches or notices
of hackingmakes consumer immune to these events and they aremore likely to ignore them (Experian 2014).
A user’s relationship with a firm depends on variety of attributes and security might be only a small part of
it. So despite an adverse security event, the user still might not change her relationship with the firm. First,
she may not even notice it. Second, maybe the firm is so much better on other attributes (nicer building,
lower prices, better service) that security deficit may not be enough to overcome other advantages. Finally,
the users might (rightly) believe that other firms in the market have similar security deficit and hence might
not be inclined to switch. In case of financial firms like a bank, this might be even more salient. In most
cases, the banks compensate end users for all financial losses (some of this follows from specific regulations
in the banking industry) alleviating the effect of a fraud significantly.
Empirically, there is little research on how users respond to such adverse events. This is despite the fact
the both policy makers and firms make certain assumptions about user behavior when designing policies
or firm specific strategies. The disclosure and transparency policies implicitly assume that consumers are
paying attention and are willing to punish tardy firms. The firms may install their own customer service
programs assuming that these programs may alleviate customer relationship. The issue of addressing a
adverse security event is evenmore important as the financial firms are also increasingly rolling out Internet
andmobile based access to customer accounts,mobile check deposits,money transfer and so on. While these
services are attractive to end users, they also come with significant security risks. Again, how important
these risks are to the end users is a big unknown. Large number of customer related frauds can impede the
adoption of these services.
A big challenge to empirically examine this issue is the lack of data. It is very hard to gather a reliable,
long time-series data where one can observe potential adverse events and subsequent user reaction. In this
paper, we are able to assemble a unique dataset of more than 500; 000 users for a period ofmore than 5 years.
Some of these customers (close to 20; 000) encounter unauthorized fraudulent transactions on their account.
These transactions are “unauthorized” - i.e. they were not recognized (and allowed) by the end users and
end users specifically complained to the bank. These transactions typically occur due to user account being
misused by someone, or someone stealing their credit card or debit card or ATM card numbers and using
them for fraudulent charges. Or, it could even occur due to victims falling prey to social engineering or
phishing scams. In most instances, the bank compensated the end user for potential losses.
This data provides us a rare opportunity to examine how customers responded to these events. It was evident
in the data that customerswere aware of these events (they informed the bank), that they incurred a financial
loss and other potential non-monetary loss. Moreover, the person (or entity) who caused the frauds remains
unknown to end users, even the bank is unable to trace the frauds to a particular entity. If these events cause
customers to lose trust in the bank’s security practices, then users might have an incentive to terminate the
relationship. In our data, we are able to observe this churn behavior. We also have detailed customer specific
data (demographic as well as transactional) as well as market structure data (for example the bank’s market
share in a givenmarket). With this data in hand, our analysis shows that these adverse events cause users to
terminate the relationship with the bank. In particular, a user is 3 percentage point more likely to terminate
relationship with the bank within six months of such an event. We also find that users are more likely to
churn when they have higher tenure or lower age groups.
As we noted, the unauthorized charges cannot be tracked back to the perpetrators. We hypothesize that
this lack of attribution is a significant source of uncertainty for end users, potentially leading to diminished
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trust with the bank. In our data, unauthorized transactions are not traced back to a particular individual or
merchant or an entity. So the end user does not know who was responsible for that transaction, whether
the matter is resolved, or whether it can occur again. We argue that this uncertainty plays an important
role in reducing customer trust. To test our hypothesis, we also collect data on transactions which, after
investigation by the bank, were attributed to another third party. For example, some of these transactions
occurred due to merchant error and user was eventually compensated by the merchant. Or, some of the
transactions were attributed to othermembers of the household. We show that indeed, when the attribution
is clear, the effect of fraudulent transactions is much smaller.
Literature review
Literature in this space can be divided into three major areas. In the first domain, studies have generally
focused on the impact of data security, breaches and role of associated regulations. In the seconddomain, the
studies focus on detection of security incidences, breaches and potential fraud. Finally, in the last domain,
there is some work on how adverse events or frauds affect customer loyalty.
Much work on data breaches and related regulations look at the potential costs of data breaches to firms and
end users (Institute 2015), (Verizon 2015). The numbers vary across studies, but it is widely believed that
data breaches cost end users significantly. Data breaches or security incidences also cost firms significantly.
Many event studies have examined the effect of data breaches on firm stock prices (Gatziaff andMcCullough
2010). Most study find a negative effect of breaches on firm stock price. Similar results were reported by
(Acquisti et al. 2006b) for privacy data breach events and by (Telang and Wattal 2007) for software flaw
disclosures. However, these studies do not provide insights into the long term effects of insecurity.
A second line of research is on various security regulations themselves. The most widely discussed law is
the data breach notification law, which was first adopted in California (SB 1386) in 2003. Since then 47
states have adopted this law. Much of the work though, focuses on the law itself, from a legal perspective
(Schwartz and Janger 2007). The purpose of the law is very clear - to impose reputational consequences
on firms so that they invest in protecting customer data. So the idea is similar to the event studies, in that
disclosure of an unpleasant event has reputational consequences for firms leading to stock price decline.
Telang (Telang 2015) provides a useful summary of the purpose of such regulations and potential impact
on firm and user behavior. There is also discussion on whether breach notification laws should become a
federal law instead of statewide laws (Tom 2010). However, measuring the impact of these (and similar)
laws on user outcome is not well studied. (Romanosky et al. 2010) show that these laws led to marginally
fewer instances of identity thefts. But the data was aggregated at the state level.
The third stream of literature focuses on the impact of frauds committed by third parties on financial firms.
As we noted, security is increasingly becoming an important issue in then banking industry and the number
of fraudulent transactions have also increased rapidly. Naturally, firms are spending significant resources in
fraud detection. There is a significant literature in Computer Science on how to detect anomalies and frauds.
One would expect that frauds would impact customers’ perception of feeling secure and protected and hence
might negatively affect customers’ relationship with the firm. This, in turn, may lead to customer churn.
However, the actual evidence on this hypothesis is rather limited. (Hoffmann and Birnbrich 2012) examine
the effect of fraud prevention on the bank-customer relationship. But their data is limited to surveys. (Suh
and Han 2003), again using surveys, show that perception of security control plays an important role in
customer trust in Internet Banking.
Based on our survey of literature, we find very little, if any, work that assembles the datawe have. We observe
real consumer behavior before and after they encounter a fraudulent event (committed by a third party) on
their bank account. We also observe users who are not exposed to such events as a comparison group. We
believe our research documents first such evidence of the impact of security frauds on user loyalty. As we
will highlight, we not only bring a novel dataset to the table, we also provide a nuanced story of how security
violations and frauds frame user response.
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Consumer behavior and hypothesis
As we noted in the introduction and literature review, much of the work is survey based where users are
asked about their security perception and corresponding trust with the firm they are transacting with. An
important theme that emerges is that a fraudulent event imposes considerable time and emotional cost to
the end users. They usually have to inform the bank of potential losses and might have to take additional
actions to mitigate possible losses (identity theft or other similar changes showing up in the future on other
accounts). This is costly, bothmonetarily and non-monetarily (say emotionally). It is reasonable to conclude
that being a fraud victim would affect the customers’ perception of bank’s security practices. This is despite
the fact the bank, almost always, compensates the end users for their losses. Thus, the user may lose her
trust in the bank and damage her relationship with the bank. This may negatively affect customer loyalty
and encourage switching behavior. So we hypothesize that -
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Users are more likely to churn when encountered with fraudulent events.
However, we also argue thatmuch of this loss in trust is an outcome of uncertainties. When the losses are not
traced back to the perpetrators, and not clearly attributed for, and the reasons are not clearly explained to
the users, they aremore likely to worry about similar attacks occurring in the future. Theymay also question
the bank’s ability to trace and deter future attacks. They may also worry about spillovers. That, these losses
may signal more potential harm in future (say identity thefts). Thus, lack of clarity on who perpetrated these
acts would lead to users placing blame on the bank, even though the fraud is actually committed by a third
party and the bank has compensated the user. On the other hand, if the attribution of these fraudulent events
is clear and reasons clearly explained, the user may rationalize the event happening despite the banks’ best
effort. Thus, we hypothesize that -
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Users are more likely to churn when the fraudulent events are not clearly attributed.
To testH2 specifically, we also collect data on fraud events which were finally tracked back to a specific third
party (a merchant, or another member of the user household, or even user realizing that it was her fault).
Data and Analysis
Thiswork is in collaborationwith one of the leading banks in theUS,whoprovidedus access to an anonymized
detailed transaction level data about its customers. We have access to approximately 500 thousand cus-
tomers which is full geographic stratified sample of the United States with higher concentrated sampling in
a couple of cities that the bank was specifically interested. For each of the anonymized customer, we have
some demographic information like age and home zip code location. For each of the account of a given cus-
tomer, we have details on all of the account types, daily branch transactions, including debits and credits,
debit card and credit card transactions, mobile transactions, transaction amounts, and information on the
relationship the customer maintains with the bank. We have up to 5 years of historical information on each
customer from last quarter of 2008 to third quarter of 2013. We also have information on customer care
call records, with the date and reason for the call, along with the resolution of the issue and the resolution
date. Specifically, in this work we concentrate on the customers who had a fraudulent transaction on their
accounts and called the bank to report the issue on their account. In this paper, we provide analysis of data
aggregated quarterly, which is important for the bank to validate the changes happening at this granularity.
In the current data, the users, after identifying potential charges on their account (all related to their bank
account, and not the credit cards), calls the bank’s customer care center for reporting the fraud. Bank in-
vestigates these complaints, resolves it, and records it in its call history database. So we know exactly when
the complaint came in, and what action was taken by the bank. Our key goal is to examine the cases which
were most likely driven by some potential security lapse (we cannot identify whether the error happened at
the user end or at the bank end). All events classified as unauthorized transactions fit this definition well. In
all these cases, the user account incurred a charge which was investigated to be unauthorized by the user. It
potentially was perpetrated by a third party who got hold of the user account or the password or misuse of
the debit card associated with the account. During our discussion with the bank executives, we learned that,
in all of the cases of unauthorized transaction, the bank issues the credit back to the user within ten days.
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We also collected data on complaints whichwere resolved to well identified third parties. For example, some
of the unauthorized transactions were linked to a specific merchant and the merchant issued the credit back
to the end user. In another category, the fraudulent transactions were found to be valid by the customer at
a later date, and the customer withdrew the complaint. Finally, in the last category, valid client charge, the
bank determined that the transaction was not a fraudulent and was in fact a valid one. The bank might have
come to this conclusion based on the investigation done on historical information of the customer. The key
difference here is that the bank did not pay the customer for the transaction amount in dispute.
Notice that in the case of merchant issued credit, the attribution is clear. The user can call the merchant
for the compensation. So, we would expect that for the merchant related fraud, customers may not hold the
bank responsible for those charges. This should not affect the trustworthiness of the banks’ security efforts
and should have smaller impact on bank-customer relationship. Similarly, when a user withdrew the claim,
we do not expect it to adversely affect banking relation.
In case of unauthorized transactions, since the matter remains unresolved, it is likely that users may hold a
bank indirectly responsible and it may adversely affect their relationship. Finally, the valid client charge is
a special case since the claim was denied by the bank and the customer did not get any compensation. So
it might lead to customer grievance, independent of whether the fraud happened or not (according to the
bank the fraud did not happen).
Our measure of the customer’s relationship with the bank is whether the user terminates the relationship
with the bank. The closure of the relationship with the bank means the customer closed all accounts and
completely terminated her relationship.
Analysis: Sample Selection
In order to estimate the effect of fraudulent transaction on closure of accounts we need to know the typical
closure behavior for the accounts with non-fraudulent transaction. While we can use the whole population,
we are worried about the selection. In particular, we are worried that users who have frauds perpetrated on
their account might be different from non-fraud accounts (say are more risky, or switch banks frequently).
To overcome this selection, we first select the non-fraudulent accounts by using Propensity Score Matching
(PSM) method, with the treatment being the occurrence of a fraudulent transaction. This method allows us
to find similar users in both fraud and non-fraud groups. We match based on various characteristics like
the tenure of the account with the bank, average balance, average number of transactions, average online
behavior - before the fraudulent event took place. We matched three control users for every treatment user.
We produce some of the summary statistics of each group of customers in the Table 1, we can see that most
of the characteristics of the group of customers are very similar except for probability of closing in the next
sixmonths. Note that currently we havematched the “normal” customers with the unauthorized transaction
customers only. In the future, wewill alsomatch for other groups (merchant issued credit, valid client charge
and client withdrew claim) of customers. Also, in ourmatching, let us say a customer experiences fraudulent
transaction at a time T . Wematched the “normal” customers with this customer who experience fraudulent
transaction, we have used the same time line T on “normal” customers. So, the number of customers and the
probability of ending the relationship in the next six months for the “normal” customers, is the probability
of closing from the respective time T used for matching.
Effect of fraudulent transaction compared to “normal” customers
We want to examine whether the occurrence of any of the fraudulent events, affects customers decision to
terminate the relationship with the bank compared to “normal” customers who have no such fraudulent
events. We propose the following specification for our first logit regression
Prob(Qi) = 0 + 1  fraudEventi + 2 Xi + 3  yeari + ; (1)
where,Qi = 1 if the customer i ends the relationship with the bank in the next six months of the incidence of
an event, fraudEventi represents the fraudulent event type that the customer experiences. We also include
Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 5
Security, Fraudulent transactions and Customer Loyalty
Table 1. Summary Statistics comparing each group of customers in our analysis
Variable Unauthorized MerchantCredit
Valid
Client
Client
Withdrew Normal
Number of
Accounts 20104 3034 1962 1210 59764
Age 41.60 44.12 42.88 47.55 43.48
Tenure 55.36 69.97 57.39 86.43 52.31
Avg Balance (in
dollars) 2750.61 3123.12 2821.45 3612.29 2921.03
ATM
Transactions
(avg per month)
4.28 3.78 4.79 6.12 3.69
Number of
customers
ending
relationship
1337 173 257 67 2290
Probability of
ending the
relationship
0.067 0.057 0.131 0.055 0.038
some of the characteristicsXi of the customer and customer’s relationship with the bank, like age, tenure of
the account inmonths, balance and the number of transactions, including yearly effects. Further, we include
a dummy if the customer’s zip code belongs to Allegheny County, where the bank has huge prevalence. The
results of the above logit function is shown in the Table 2
From the Table 2 we see that fraud event types: unauthorized transaction, merchant credit and valid client
charge, increase the likelihood of closing the relationship with the bank compared to normal customers.
However, there is no significant effect when the clientwithdrew the claim. More specifically, when compared
to normal customers, unauthorized transaction increased the likelihood of closing by 3.2 percentage points.
This is consistent with our hypothesis inH1.
We also find that themerchant credit and valid client charge increased the likelihood of churn by 2:3 percent-
age points and 7:3 percentage points respectively. Though the merchant credit dummy is only marginally
significant, it still seems to suggest that despite clear attribution (to themerchants), users stillmay terminate
their relationship with the bank. So H2 is only partially supported. In the following sections, we provide
another method to control for potential selection in our comparison groups. Finally, “valid client charge”
has a very large effect on ending the relationship, possibly due to the customer grievance that the request
for fraudulent transaction was denied by the bank and she is not compensated for the transaction amount.
In terms of the location characteristics, we find that a customer being in Allegheny County, where the bank
has a larger market share, the effect is significantly smaller. So users are less likely to churn, in general,
when the bank is a dominant player in that market.
Comparing customers with their future counterparts
We analyzed the closure of the relationship in the next six months by comparing “normal” customers with
the customers with one of the four kinds of fraudulent events. The normal customers are currently chosen by
propensity score matching techniques as described above. However, it might be that even after matching,
the normal group might be different from the groups that encountered fraud. This may under (or over)
estimate the true effect of the adverse events.
As a robustness check, we now propose the following method. We compare the quit rate of the customers
within same cohort. So we compare the users who experienced fraud and quit at time T , with the users who
experienced fraud, but did not quit at time T but continued on andmight quit later. The idea here is that the
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Table 2. Logit results for ending the relationship with the bank based on each fraudulent
event type compared to “normal” customers
Variable Coefficient Estimate p-value
Unauthorized 0.6372 <2e-16***
Merchant Credit 0.5061 0.03494*
Valid Client Charge 1.1570 1.35e-06***
Client Withdrew 0.6266 0.14194
In Allegheny -0.3486 1.05e-14***
Age -0.006 1.78e-06***
Tenure -0.0155 <2e-16***
Balance -0.00009 0.00505**
ATM Transactions -0.0037 0.18727
Year 2009 0.261 0.00328**
Year 2010 0.025 0.70877
Year 2011 -0.170 0.00259**
Year 2012 -0.0151 0.76737
Table 3. Logit regression of comparing customerswho quit immediatelywith customerswho
chose to stay on and might quit later
Variable Coefficient Estimate p-value
Unauthorized 0.257 <2e-16***
Merchant Credit 0.0938 0.692518
Valid Client Charge 0.566 0.003731**
Client Withdrew 0.133 0.734258
In Allegheny -0.2975 <2e-16***
Age -0.0017 0.056834
Tenure -0.008 <2e-16***
Balance -9.243e-05 <2e-16**
ATM Transactions -1.042e-04 0.131335
Year 2009 -0.005 0.941662
Year 2010 -0.167 0.000958***
Year 2011 0.298 <2e-16***
Year 2012 0.470 <2e-16***
future quit rate provides a baseline quit rate for users (all of whom experience a particular type of fraud).
While the “within six month” quit rate provide the effect of fraud. By comparing users within a cohort (all
were defrauded), we are comparingmore homogeneous users, reducing the possibility of selection (whenwe
compare defrauded users to “normal” users). Again, in this case we run a logit regression with the following
specification except that we are not using normal users in our sample.
Prob(Qi) = 0 + 1  fraudEventi + 2 Xi + 3  yeari + ; (2)
where, again, Xi describes the customer characteristics, like age, tenure, balance and ATM transactions,
along with yearly effects. The results of the logit specification is shown in Table 3.
From the Table 3 we see that only unauthorized and valid client charge have a significant effect on the quit
rate. More specifically, when compared to their future counterparts, unauthorized transaction leads to 1
percentage point more likely to end the relationship within six months, and valid client charge leads to 2:7
percentage points more likely to end the relationship. For the group of customers for whom the merchant
issued credit or if the client withdrew the claim there is no significant effect in quit rates. This confirms, our
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earlier hypothesisH2 that when the attribution of the loss is clear, usersmight not hold the bank responsible.
Conclusion
Using a large sample of users, from a financial firm, for a period of time, we examine how fraudulent finan-
cial charges affect users’ relationship with the firm. These frauds were mostly an outcome of users’ financial
information being stolen and misused. It is also noteworthy that all customer loss was compensated back
to the user by the bank. Our results suggest that even when the bank is not directly responsible for a fraud-
ulent transaction, users may hold the bank responsible and terminate their relationship. For unauthorized
transaction, when the attribution of perpetrators is unclear, this effect is large (from 1 to 3 percentage point).
Further, this effect is much larger when users are not compensated because the bank determined that the
charges might be legitimate. These effects are bigger for users with larger tenure. One of the implications
of our research for the banks is, to consider following up with the customers who experience a fraudulent
event and make sure the relationship is not adversely affected.
We are currently continuing our research to understand the effect of security event on the time to close
the relationship with the bank through survival analysis (Fichman and Kemerer 1999), (Morita et al. 1993).
Furthermore, we have not calculated the lifetime value of these users yet but it is clear that these frauds
carry both direct and indirect costs to banks, in particular. The banks incur a direct cost of identifying
frauds, invest in customer service, and in compensating users. On top, there is an indirect cost of potentially
losing the customers. Our research highlights that users are, when being aware of the fraud, do take expected
actions. That is, they are willing to punish the firm leading to possibly larger security investments by the
firm. Our research seems to confirm the efficacy of the some of the regulations whose goal is to highlight
firms’ security and data protection practices.
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